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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we analyze the innovative performance of alliance networks as a 
function of the technological distance between partners, a firm’s network position 
(centrality) and total network density. We study how these three elements of an 
alliance network, apart and in combination, affect the ‘twin tasks’ in exploration, 
namely novelty creation on the one hand and its efficient absorption on the other 
hand.  For an empirical test, we study technology-based alliance networks in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical and automotive industry.  
JEL – codes: O31, O32, L14, L24, L25  




There is now increasing consensus in the academic literature that a firm’s 
embeddedness in a network of interfirm relations matters for its economic and 
innovative performance (Nooteboom, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell e.a., 1996; 
Rowley e.a. 2000; Ahuja 2000; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). The empirical 
evidence has indicated that this relationship between embeddedness and innovation 
can be found in industries as diverse as chemicals (Ahuja, 2000), biotechnology 
(Baum e.a., 2000; Powell, e.a. 1999), semiconductors (Stuart, 2000), textile (Uzzi, 
1996), personal computers (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and banking (Zaheer and 
Bell, 2005). More recently, some studies have started to unravel this notion of 
embeddedness in order to understand in what specific ways it contributes to a firm’s 
innovation performance. Here, characteristics of partners have been studied such as 
their degree of innovativeness (Stuart, 2000) as well as the properties of alliances such 
as the role of formal governance mechanisms (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996), equity vs. 
non-equity alliances (Rowley e.a. 2000) or the role of repeated contacts (Hagedoorn et 
al. 2005; Wuyts e.a., 2005). Beyond the dyad level, studies at the network level have 
shown that the properties of an alliance network also affect innovation. Here it has 
been shown that apart from the number of direct ties (Ahuja, 2000; Shan et al. 1994) 
also a firm’s indirect ties (Ahuja, 2000) and the redundancy among these ties (Ahuja, 
2000; Baum e.a., 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) affect its innovation performance.  
    In most of these studies an important function of alliances is that they function as 
‘pipelines’ through which information and knowledge flows between firms (Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2004). This focus on the diffusion potential of alliances may not be 
surprising as most studies on the role of embeddedness have been assuming 
conditions of relative environmental stability. Here, embeddedness refers to 
routinization and stabilization of linkages among members as a result of a history of 
exchanges and relations within a group or community (Gulati, 1998). Under such 
structure-reinforcing conditions, the role of embeddedness is increasingly well 
understood (Gulati, 1998; Madhavan et al., 1998; Koka et al., 2006). These conditions 
connect with March’s category of exploitation (1991) in which environmental 
uncertainty is rather limited and the focus is on the refinement and extension of 
existing competences and technologies. The rationale for teaming up with partners 
then is formed by possibilities to obtain complementary know-how (Teece, 1986) 
and/or to speed up the R&D-process in industries where time-to market is crucial. 
Here, cooperation is attractive as partners have a good understanding of the relevant 
issues at hand (Hansen et al., 2001) and alliances enable a rapid diffusion of 
knowledge among partners, enhancing the efficiency and speed of cooperation 
(Gilsing, 2005).  
    In this strand of literature, an implicit underlying assumption is that similarity of 
partners is beneficial for learning and innovation. This follows from Cohen and 
Levinthal’s influential notion of absorptive capacity (1990), i.e. the idea that the 
extent to which firms can learn from external knowledge is largely dependent upon 
the similarity of the partners’ knowledge bases. In a similar vein, different studies 
have demonstrated that learning potential declines with an increase in dissimilarity of 
knowledge stocks (Hamel, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; 
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). So, for interorganisational learning in exploitation, 
similarity is attractive and distances in knowledge and cognition (cognitive distance) 
form a liability.  
    This raises the question of how to understand the role of network embeddedness in 
view of exploration that can be characterized by a break away from the established 
 3
way of doing things, with a focus on the discovery and experimentation of new 
technologies (March, 1991; Nooteboom, 2000). By its very nature, exploration is not 
about efficiency of current activities, but rather forms an uncertain process that deals 
with the search for new, technology based business opportunities (Rowley et al., 
2000; Nooteboom, 2000), which requires production of new insights and knowledge. 
This points to a different role of a firm’s alliance network, namely its recombination 
potential in view of new knowledge creation rather than its function as a channel for 
diffusion of existing information and knowledge in view of exploitation. Existing 
literature has largely ignored this role of alliances for novelty creation and is therefore 
unable to explain the development of new knowledge and competencies (Hagedoorn, 
Link and Vonartas, 2000; Phelpes, 2005). In contrast to exploitation, in this process of 
exploration partners’ similarity is unattractive whereas cognitive distance between 
partners forms an important asset. 
The main aim of this paper is to develop an understanding of the role of a firm’s 
alliance network in view of exploration. To do so, we will develop the following two 
steps. First, we will consider this role of cognitive distance between firms in order to 
understand in how far dissimilarity between partners is attractive in view of 
exploration. Second, we combine such a cognitive view with a social structural one. 
In this way we complement the literature that has predominantly focused on the role 
of economic and social factors regarding alliance formation and the role of network 
embeddedness (Gulati, 1998). A cognition-based understanding of these processes is 
however still in its infancy (Moran, 2005). Combining the role of cognitive and social 
structural factors may provide us with new insights in what constitutes an optimal 
network structure for exploration. As we will argue, for exploration firms are faced 
with a dual task. On the one hand, they need to develop access to heterogeneous 
sources of knowledge and in this way create a potential for novel combinations. This 
requires an emphasis on diversity and disintegrated network structures, which is 
related to Burt’s argument (1992) stressing the benefits of access to non-redundant 
contacts to obtain novel information (novelty value). On the other hand, firms need to 
make sure that such novel knowledge, once accessed, is evaluated and when proven to 
be valuable, is adequately absorbed (absorptive capacity). As we will argue, this 
process favors more homogenous network structures in view of integrating the diverse 
inputs obtained from distant partners (Hansen et al., 1999). This is more in line with 
Coleman’s view (1988) stressing the benefits of redundant network structures. Given 
these differences between the two tasks, we claim that a firm’s network will impact 
differently on each task. So, an important contribution of this paper is that it 
investigates in how far optimal embeddedness for novelty creation may form a burden 
for absorptive capacity and vice versa. In this way, we may shed new light on the 
ongoing debate on the validity of the arguments by Burt, favoring structural holes, 
versus those of Coleman, favoring closure. The debate until now has focused on how 
the two views differ, but our emphasis on the joint consideration of absorption and 
novelty creation may enable us to see in how far both views are complementary. 
    This paper is structured as follows. First we elaborate our theoretical argument and 
formulate a number of hypotheses. Then, we present details about the data, the 
specification of variables, and the estimation method. Next, we present our main 
findings and a discussion of the results. Finally, we provide the main conclusions and 




THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
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As argued, the central focus of this paper is on the role of a firm’s alliance network 
regarding the ‘twin tasks’ of on the one hand creating novel combinations, and on the 
other hand the build up of absorptive capacity for understanding such novel 
combinations. To understand its role, we study a firm’s alliance network along three 
dimensions. First, following Nooteboom et al. (2005), we consider the role of 
cognitive distance among the firms making up such an alliance network. Here, 
cognitive distance refers to the extent that firms differ in their technological 
knowledge and expertise. We analyze how cognitive distance affects the potential for 
novelty creation and for the build up of absorptive capacity. Next we focus on the role 
of a firm’s position in a network and also analyze how this affects the potential for 
novelty creation and its absorption. As a third element of a firm’s alliance network we 
study the role of network density, as a property of the total network, and analyze its 
effect along similar lines. By considering cognitive distance as well as position and 
network density we combine a cognitive view of a firm’s alliance network with a 
social structural view. Whereas a cognitive view elucidates the potential for 
recombination due to distances in cognition between firms, a social structural view 
highlights how technology-based alliances serve as the mechanism for crossing such 
distances and accessing (proximate and distant) partners. In this way, combining the 
two perspectives provides a complementary theoretical foundation for understanding 
the role of a firm’s alliance network in exploration. 
 
Exploration 
The distinction between exploration and exploitation goes back to Holland (1975) and 
was later further developed by March (1991). Exploitation can be characterized as a 
process of routinisation, which adds to the existing knowledge base and competence 
set of firms without changing the nature of activities (March, 1991). This resembles 
‘local search’ in which firms search for new knowledge that is less likely to conflict 
with their existing cognitive and mental models (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
1
 They 
develop more and more competence in their particular field, further increasing the 
chance of immediate and positive returns. Exploitation may therefore increase a 
firm’s innovative performance due to returns from specialization, however, it may 
also lead to technological obsolescence and leave firms locked out from new 
developments (March, 1991; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). To escape from this lock-in 
situation, firms need to engage in so-called exploration that can be characterized by 
breaking with an existing dominant design and a shift away from existing rules, 
norms, routines and activities, in search of novel combinations. Hence exploration is 
not about efficiency of current activities and cannot be planned for. It is an uncertain 
process that is characterized by a constant search for new opportunities.
2
  Although 
the literature agrees on the fact that alliance networks form an important instrument in 
this process (Powell et al, 1996; Rowley et al, 2000), there is very limited empirical 
evidence of how they facilitate the creation of new knowledge in this process of 
exploration.  
    An important issue here is that we take a firm’s perspective on exploration. In other 
words, in this paper we will focus on the creation of technological knowledge that is 
                                                 
1  Underlying this is the idea of the relative inertia of firms, as advanced by population ecology that firms are 
better at doing more of the same than at adapting tot change (Carrol and Hannan, 2000). 
2  Exploration and exploitation are related and build on each other: exploration develops into exploitation, and 
exploration emerges from exploitation, in ways that go beyond the present paper (see for a further discussion 
Nooteboom (2000) and Gilsing and Nooteboom (2006).  
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new to the firm. So, we consider knowledge as novel and the activities to create such 
knowledge as exploratory if it falls outside a firm’s existing knowledge stock, even 
though it may have been in existence elsewhere earlier. This clearly differs from 
exploration that yields knowledge that is new to the industry or perhaps even new to 
the world. These latter two form ‘newly emerging’ respectively ‘pioneering’ 
technologies and represent (much) more radical types of exploration (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001).  
 
Role of technological distance 
Regarding the role of cognitive distance, Nooteboom (1999) proposed a model, which 
was tested by Wuyts et al. (2005) and by Nooteboom et al. (2005). The key argument 
in the model is that while larger distances in cognition have a negative effect on 
absorptive capacity, it has a positive effect on the potential for novelty creation. In 
first instance, as cognitive distance increases, it has a positive effect on learning by 
interaction because it yields opportunities for novel combinations of complementary 
resources. However, at a certain point cognitive distance becomes so large as to 
preclude sufficient mutual understanding needed to utilize those opportunities. Of 
course, a certain degree of mutual understanding is needed for collaboration, and 
familiarity certainly breeds trust (Gulati, 1995a), which facilitates successful 
collaboration. However, too much familiarity may take out the innovative steam from 
collaboration. The challenge then is to find partners at sufficient cognitive distance to 
learn something new, but not so distant as to preclude mutual understanding.  
    In general, cognitive distance entails more than only technological distance, 
although there is correlation between technological distance and distance in other 
functional disciplines such as marketing, production and engineering (Phelpes, 2005). 
In this paper, we specify cognitive distance in terms of technological distance, for two 
empirical reasons. First, our measure of innovative success will be based on patents, 
and there technological knowledge is more dominant. A second, more pragmatic 
argument is that it is not clear how, precisely, other dimensions of cognitive distance 
should be measured (cf. Wuyts et al. 2005).  
    Reframing the logic of the above argument in terms of technological distance: 
absorptive capacity declines with technological distance, and novelty value increases 
with it. For both effects of technological distance the simplest effect would be linear, 
and this is hypothesized until theoretical or empirical arguments emerge for a more 
complicated effect. Seen in this way, innovative performance by collaboration is 
hypothesized to arise from the interaction (modelled as the mathematical product) of 
novelty value and absorptive capacity. The basic idea here is that there is an inverted-
U shaped relationship. Mathematically: 
 
AC = a0 – a1.TD    and  (1) 
NV = b0 + b1.TD 
a0, a1, b0, b1 > 0. (2) 
 
Where 
AC = absorptive capacity, NV = novelty value, TD = technological distance 
 
The innovation performance of collaboration in the dyad (= IP) is defined as the 
product of the two linear effects:  
 
IP = AC.NV (3) 
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Replacing AC and NV by the right hand side of equations (1) and (2) yields: 
 




Equation (4) results in an inverse U-shaped effect if and only if.: 
 
a0.b1 > b0.a1 (5) 
 
In sum, this leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Exploration is an inverse U-shaped function of technological distance.  
 
Role of network position 
Unlike the local search process of exploitation (March, 1991), the search process in 
exploration is ‘recombinant’, reflecting the idea that novelty arises as the result of 
(re)combining and transforming existing and novel elements of knowledge into 
something radically new (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Here, the role of an 
alliance network is that it brings together a variety of skills and experience, which 
provides a potential for the generation of Schumpeterian novel combinations 
(Schumpeter, 1939). In this case, alliances do not serve as channels for the diffusion 
of existing knowledge and competencies but rather generate a recombination potential 
in view of new knowledge creation. This recombination potential originates from the 
fact that knowledge, values and behavior are more homogenous within groups than 
between groups, so that firms connected across groups have more access to alternative 
ways of thinking, which gives them more options for creating new combinations (Burt 
2004).
3
  So, to effectuate this recombination potential of its alliance network, firms 
should develop ties to companies that are themselves not connected to a firm’s 
existing group of partners. A tie will provide access to new information and 
entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that it offers access to non-redundant 
sources of information (Burt, 1992). Such a tie spans a structural hole. Structural 
holes guarantee that the partnering companies on both sides of the hole have access to 
different flows of information (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) and that the information 
that comes from these mutually unconnected allies is non-redundant. 
    A key issue here is that possibilities to create such non-redundant ties are not 
equally spread across firms. A firm’s network position importantly conditions the 
possibility to create alliances to such non-redundant partners and benefit from these 
accordingly. Central firms become better informed about what is going on in the 
network This increases possibilities for central firms to initiate the formation of new 
alliances (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Moreover, this combination of timely 
access to important and novel information and their higher status and power increases 
their bargaining power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Burt, 2004), which also 
improves possibilities to benefit more from their alliances than less central firms. 
Following this, we expect that central firms form attractive partners to ally with, 
which enhances the likelihood that these central players, when engaging in 
exploration, will create alliances to non-redundant partners and benefit from these 
alliances accordingly. As a consequence, we anticipate that centrality has a positive 
                                                 
3
  Quoting Burt here: “People who stand near the holes in a social structure are at a higher risk of 
having good ideas” (Burt: 349, 2004).  
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effect on the search for novel combinations and hence on exploration, in particular on 
novelty value. 
However, searching through non-redundant ties comes at a price and bears certain 
risks. A consequence of having access to many non-redundant ties is that central firms 
have to deal with a higher volume of more diverse information that will arrive at 
faster rates when compared with less central firms (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). 
This consumes time and resources that cannot be allocated for absorbing and 
integrating the obtained novel insights. As a consequence, abundant exploration and 
search through non-redundant contacts may come at a price of limited attention for 
absorption. Second, a sole focus on searching for novelty through non-redundant ties 
may result in a random drift so that a firm’s knowledge base changes continuously in 
different and unrelated directions, making the accessed novel knowledge difficult to 
absorb and integrate (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). So, both 
from a search-costs and cognition point of view, too many non-redundant ties will 
decrease the potential for novelty absorption. In other words, centrality spurs the 
possibilities for novelty creation but at high(er) levels it may impede the possibilities 
for absorption of this novelty.  
Thus, we hypothesize that centrality has a positive effect on novelty value (NV) 
and a negative effect on absorptive capacity (AC), and by the same logic as for the 
effects of technological distance, with innovative performance being a product of NV 
and AC), this yields an inverse U-shaped effect on exploration: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Exploration is an inverse U-shaped function of centrality. 
     
Role of network density 
In contrast to the effects of centrality, we anticipate that network density limits the 
potential for novelty creation whereas it enhances the build up of absorptive capacity. 
As we will argue, both direct and indirect ties play a role in the build up of absorptive 
capacity. Therefore we consider the role of ‘global network density’, which considers 
both types of ties as a property of the total network, rather than the density of ties 
surrounding a specific node. As we will argue, both direct and indirect ties play a role 
in the build up of absorptive capacity.  
    Novel knowledge from a direct partner, especially at a large technological distance, 
may not be readily understandable for a firm. If one is not able to adequately 
understand novel information from a given source, one may need another partner to 
complement one’s absorptive capacity (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). More 
precisely, if A remains linked to both B and C, even if there is also a link between B 
and C, this may help A to understand C by comparing what A understands from C 
with what B understands from C. In other words, even if a firm’s direct ties are known 
to be redundant for access to sources of information, they may both be needed to 
understand and absorb knowledge accessed in the other relation. This is the case 
particularly when engaging in exploration, where new and distant knowledge is 
accessed, and dominant designs and standards may be lacking. Moreover, the tacit and 
experimental nature of exploration further increases the difficulty of firms to 
recognize and value the technology of potential partners when they are not connected 
through a common alliance partner. In this way, indirect ties can enhance the 
absorptive capacity of the firm by acting as device for screening and interpreting 
novel information on its potential relevance and value for him (Leonard-Barton, 1984; 
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2005). In addition, even if one does understand a given source, 
one may not be able to judge the reliability of information, so that, like researchers in 
gathering potentially biased data, one may need a third party as a source for 
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triangulation (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). In this way, firms may be able to 
develop a richer understanding and a better evaluation of the acquired novelty 
(Rowley et al., 2000).  
In addition, a dense network of direct and indirect ties also facilitates the build-up 
of trust, a reputation mechanism, and coalitions to constrain opportunism (Gulati, 
1995; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). These are the prime arguments for closure, 
introduced by Coleman (1988). They apply especially to exploration in view of the 
uncertainty surrounding it, which limits options for governance by formal contracts 
(Nooteboom, 1999, 2002).  
Now, density and its potential for trust building enables a proliferation of 
triangulation, as follows. First, it is useful for neighbors of the focal firm to be 
mutually connected for triangulation. Next, information from any neighbor is richer 
and more reliable to the extent that the neighbor also profits from triangulation among 
his neighbors. 
So, density through direct ties and indirect ties plays an important role with regard 
to assessing the reliability of (distant) sources of novelty as well as understanding and 
evaluating these sources. In sum, we propose that density enhances the absorptive 
capacity of each individual firm in the network.   
    Let us now turn to the arguments against dense networks. One argument entails that 
there are costs associated with establishing and maintaining contacts and that by 
shedding redundant ties, firms can create efficiency in their network (Burt, 1992). 
However, in exploration such costs of redundancy play a limited role as the key focus 
here is on finding and absorbing novelty, making considerations of efficiency less of 
an issue (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005).  
The main argument against high density, however, is that it inhibits the existence 
and the utilization of diversity, and hence of novelty value. When knowledge is more 
densely spread across firms in the network, the benefits of direct ties and indirect ties 
in giving access to novelty will decline, because ‘everyone knows what everyone 
knows’. Firms are less likely to gain new or additional information from their indirect 
ties, as the information that can be obtained from them will be very similar to the 
knowledge already obtained from its direct contacts. As a consequence, the potential 
for creating novel combinations will diminish.  
    Also, a dense network increases the likelihood that knowledge and information 
reaching the company through its alliance network also reaches its partners. This may 
create a risk of undesirable spillovers. Such diffusion of novelty throughout the 
network can put limits on its appropriation and makes it less attractive for firms to 
search for such novelty (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). 
    A final argument against density is, as indicated before, that it facilitates effective 
sanctions. As pointed out by Coleman (1988), dense networks enable reputation 
effects, and yield opportunities for coalitions to constrain behaviour. This is useful for 
the governance of relational risk, but may create strong behavioral pressures to 
conform rather than to be radically different (Kraatz, 1998). Firms may also be 
preempted from entering into new, more innovative relationships, as the implicit 
expectation of loyalty to their existing partners and network may inhibit them from 
allying with others (Buchko 1994; Nooteboom, 1999; Duysters and Lemmens 2003; 
Gulati et al, 2000).  
In sum, density supports the build up of shared absorptive capacity but it may 
impede the possibilities for search and novelty creation. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 




The effects of technological distance (TD) (Hypothesis 1), betweenness centrality 
(BC) (Hypothesis 2) and network density (D) (Hypothesis 3) apply simultaneously, 
and hence there are interaction effects between them. Theoretically, the inverse U-
shaped effects result from opposite effects on absorptive capacity (AC) and novelty 
value (NV), which are multiplied in their effects on exploration performance, as 
specified previously for the effect of technological distance. 
 In Hypothesis 1 we posited that technological distance has a negative effect on 
absorptive capacity and a positive effect on novelty value. In Hypothesis 2 we argued 
that centrality has a negative effect on absorptive capacity and a positive effect on 
novelty value. In hypothesis 3 we assume that network density has a positive effect on 
absorptive capacity and a negative effect on novelty value    
For the combined effects, the full model then becomes: 
 
AC = a0 –a1.TD - a2.BC + a3.D (6) 
NV = b0 + b1.TD + b2.BC – b3.D (7) 
a0 , a1 , a2 , a3 ,  b0 , b1 , b2 , b3 > 0 
 
Multiplying (6) and (7) provides the equation for exploration performance (IP) 
 
IP = AC.NV = (8) 








- (a1.b2 + a2.b1).TD.BC + (a1.b3 + a3.b1).TD.D + (a2.b3 + a3.b2).BC.D 
 
Where  
a0.b1 > b0.a1, a0.b2 > b0.a2  and b0.a3 > a0.b3 (9) 
 
This mathematical model can be interpreted in the following way. The interaction 
effect of two variables on exploration is negative when they have an effect in the same 
direction on novelty value or on absorptive capacity. These yield alternative ways for 
achieving those effects and here the variables can be considered as substitutes. This 
applies to the interaction effect between technological distance and betweenness 
centrality, which both enhance novelty value while decreasing absorptive capacity. 
Thus, such a combined increase in the potential for novelty value with a decrease of 
the ability to absorb this novelty has a negative net effect on exploration. Interaction 
effects are positive when variables have opposite effects on novelty value and on 
absorptive capacity. Here, the interaction effects form complements. An increase in 
novelty value is accompanied by an increase in the ability to absorb it. This applies to 
the interaction effects between technological distance and density as well as to the 
interaction effect between betweenness centrality and density. In both cases, an 
increase in novelty value, due to an increase of technological distance or an increase 
of centrality, is accompanied by an increase in absorptive capacity due to an increase 
of network density.  
    In other words, there are alternative strategies for the maximization of exploration. 
High (low) technological distance would need to be compensated by low (high) 
betweenness centrality and/or high (low) density. High (low) betweenness centrality 
would have to be compensated by low (high) technological distance and/or high 
(low)_density. High (low) density would have to be compensated by high (low) 
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technological distance and/or high (low) betweenness centrality.   In sum, this leads to 
our final three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The interaction between technological distance and betweenness 
centrality has a negative effect on exploration. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The interaction between technological distance and density has a 
positive effect on exploration. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The interaction between betweenness centrality and density has a 
positive effect on exploration.     
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data 
The sample set for this study consisted of panel data on the alliance and patenting 
activities of 116 companies in the chemicals, automotive and pharmaceutical 
industries. The reason to choose these three industries is that they share the 
importance of investing in R&D and innovation, but that they also reveal profound 
differences regarding some key characteristics such as the stage of industry 
development (Walker et al., 1997), the importance of exploration vis-à-vis 
exploitation (Rowley et al., 2000) and the importance of product versus process 
innovations (Tidd et al, 1997)
4
. Testing our hypotheses in different industries enables 
us to assess in how far the role of a firm’s alliance network for exploration and 
exploitation remains invariant across industries, enhancing the generalization of the 
results. 
 The focal firms that we study were observed over a 12-year period, from 1986 
until 1997. The panel is unbalanced because of new start-ups and mergers and 
acquisitions. The 116 companies were selected to include the largest companies in 
these three industries that were also establishing technology based strategic alliances. 
Information on the establishment of alliances is hard to obtain for small or privately 
owned companies. Previous studies on inter-firm alliances also focused on leading 
companies in an industry (Ahuja, 2000a; Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  
In total, 994 alliances were established in the period 1986-1996 among these 
companies. Alliance data were retrieved from the MERIT-CATI database, which 
contains information on nearly 15 thousands cooperative technology agreements and 
their ‘parent’ companies, covering the period 1970-1996 (see Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002) for a further description).  
Exploration, the dependent variable, is based on patent counts. All patenting data 
were retrieved from the US Patent Office Database for all the companies in the 
sample, also those based outside the US. Working with U.S. patents – the largest 
patent market - is preferable to the use of several national patent systems “…to 
maintain consistency, reliability and comparability, as patenting systems across 
nations differ in the application of standards, system of granting patents, and value of 
protection granted” (Ahuja, 2000a; p. 434). Especially in industries where companies 
                                                 
4
  Pharmaceuticals with its invasion of biotechnologies reflects a younger type of industry that 
stresses the importance of exploration (Powell et al., 2005), whereas chemicals and automotive 
form mature industries with some more reliance on exploitation (Coriat and Weinstein, 2001). 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry has a strong focus on product innovations (Powell 1990, 
Walker et al., 1997), whereas chemicals show a strong focus on process innovations and the 
automotive industry a mixture of both (Marsili, 2001). 
 11
operate on an international or global scale U.S. patents may be a good proxy for 
companies’ worldwide innovative performance.  
   For companies in the three sectors the financial data were derived from a 





Dependent variable  
The different hypotheses test the effect of technological distance, network position 
and overall network density on the explorative innovation performance of companies 
in the chemical, automotive and pharmaceutical industry. To derive the dependent 
variable, technological profiles of all focal companies were computed to find out 
whether new patents in the year of observation could be categorized as ‘explorative’. 
These technological profiles were created by adding up the number of patents a firm 
received in each patent class during the five years prior to the year of observation. 
Different scholars have argued that a moving window of 5 years is an appropriate 
timeframe for assessing the technological impact of prior inventions (Podolny and 
Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja, 
2000a). Studies about R&D depreciation (Griliches, 1979, 1984) suggest that 
knowledge capital depreciates sharply, losing most of its economic value within 5 
years. The USPTO-classes were determined at two-digit level, which resulted in 
approximately 400 classes. 
From these technology profiles we can distinguish between exploitative and 
explorative technology classes. Classes in which a company receives a patent in the 
year of observation but had not received a patent in the previous five years were 
considered ‘explorative’ patent classes
5
. Since knowledge remains relatively new and 
unexplored for a firm immediately after patenting, patent classes kept their 
explorative ‘status’ for 3 consecutive years, parallel to Ahuja and Lampert’s (2001) 
concept of novel and emerging technologies
6
. All the classes in which a company had 
successfully applied for a patent the previous five years and successfully applied for a 
patent in the year of observation were considered ‘exploitative’ patent classes. 
 
Independent variables 
Explanatory variables  
Technological distance, centrality and overall network density are the three 
explanatory variables that have to be operationalized. The first variable is based on 
USPTO patent count data. The other two are calculated based on the alliances that 
were established during the 5 year period prior to the year of observation. This 
moving window approach is considered to be an appropriate timeframe during which 
the existing alliance portfolio is likely to have an influence on the current technological 
performance of a firm (Kogut 1988, 1989; Gulati, 1995b). 
Technological distance: Technological distance was measured on the basis of 
CRTA, which is the Pearson correlation index of the distribution across technological 
classes of the revealed technological advantages (RTA) of each firm relative to the 
other sample firms. The RTA of a firm in a particular technological field is given by 
                                                 
5
  We chose the year when the company filed for the patent rather than the year when it was granted, 
because the innovation in the company already has been realized when the company files for a 
patent. 
6
  In order to test  the robustness of this measure, we also constructed a 'exploration patents'-variable 
where explorative patents could keep this status for 5 years instead of 3 years. 
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the firm's share in that field of the US patents granted to all companies in the study, 
relative to its overall share of all US patents granted to these companies. The RTA 
index varies around one, such that a value higher than one suggests that a firm is 
comparatively specialized in the technology in question, given its overall innovative 
performance. Positive values of CRTA indicate similarity of the pattern of relative 
technological specialization of firms, as it appears from the distribution of their patent 
activity across technological fields. For each firm and each year, a profile was 
constructed of its revealed technological advantage (RTA) in each patent class.  
A company’s RTA-index in a patent class is defined as the firm’s share of patents 
in that class (compared to all its alliance partners) divided by its share in all patent 
classes. The correlation coefficient was computed pairwise between the RTA-profile 
of the focal firm and that of each of its alliance partners. The CRTA variable is then 
calculated as the average of these correlations. The values for CRTA can theoretically 
vary from –1 to 1. As positive (negative) values indicate smaller (larger) technological 
distances, we choose to transform this variable into a new one ('Technological 
distance’) with a minimum value of zero and a maximum of hundred, where higher 
values indicate larger technological distance. 
The values for this variable in table 2 indicate that the average technological 
distance is 42.4 with a standard deviation of 7.1. The maximum distance is 52.5 and 
the minimum 4.8. 
Overall network density: This explanatory variable is a characteristic of the 
overall alliance network in a particular year for one of the three industries. This 
variable is "calculated as the number of all ties occurring in the matrix divided by the 
number of all possible ties.” (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). Table 2 shows that the 
networks are sparse. The network are calculated for each year and each industry: the 
density ranges from 0.5% tot 2.9%. The average is 1.3%.   
    Network centrality: The second variable, related to a firm’s alliance network, is its 
betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality measures the centrality of a focal firm 
in a network, and is calculated as the fraction of shortest paths between other 
companies that pass through the focal firm. Betweenness is, in some sense, a measure 
of the influence a focal firm has over the information through the alliance network. In 
other words, it also forms a network-wide (global) measure and takes direct and 
indirect ties into account. This is important as this indicates in how far a firm can 
reach potentially all (including also distant) parts of the network. This provides us 
with an indication of the potential for novel combinations that a firm may have.  
We standardized this measure to compare betweenness centralization of firms 
across different alliance networks – different years and industries. In theory, 
standardized values can range from 0 to 100. Table 2 indicates that the values for this 
variable range from 0 tot 38. On average, firms have a network position with  a low 
value for betweenness centrality, but there are a few companies that are in the midst 
of the action.   
       
Control variables 
Other variables can of course also affect the explorative innovation performance 
of these firms. We included three types of dummy variables. A first one indicates 
where the company is headquartered geographically. Following the Triad-concept of 
the world economy, a company can be headquartered in North America, Asia or 
Europe - the default is Asia (Ohmae, 1985). Firms that are headquartered in different 
countries may differ in their propensity to patent. Annual dummy variables were 
included to capture changes over time in the propensity of companies to patent their 
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innovations.  Finally, we included a dummy variable to indicate whether a company is 
a car manufacturer or chemical firm (default is the pharmaceutical industry).  
Furthermore, we included three organizational variables as controls
7
. The first one is 
the age of the company. Older firms, with their accumulated experience, are expected to 
be better at exploitation, and younger firms, with lower stakes and habituation in old 
technologies, to be better at exploration. Hence, we expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient of this variable.  
The natural logarithm of ‘corporate revenues’- a proxy for firm size - was included 
as a control variable. Firm size is expected to enhance exploitative learning (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1991). Large firms have the financial means and vast technological and 
other resources to invest heavily in R&D. However, they usually experience problems 
in diversifying into new technological areas inhibiting experimentation and favoring 
specialization along existing technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). As a result, large firms are disadvantaged 
with respect to exploring new technological fields and will innovate proportionally 
less than smaller firms in new technological areas (Nooteboom, 1991; Nooteboom 
and Vossen, 1995). 
R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales) is expected to have a 
positive impact on exploration: firms that invest heavily in R&D will have a higher rate 
of innovation assuming that there exists a positive correlation between technological 
input and output (Pakes and Griliches, 1984). R&D investments also play a role in the 
ability of companies to recognize, value and assimilate external knowledge. Absorptive 
capacity is crucial to acquire and integrate external knowledge, especially when the 
knowledge is tacit. Firms conduct R&D to be more able to use the technology of other 
companies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). This 
absorptive capacity argument is particularly relevant in the case of explorative learning 
because the knowledge to transfer is tacit and the focal firm has not yet built any 
capabilities in these technological areas.   
 
Model estimation 
The dependent variable is a count variable and only takes nonnegative integer 
values - i.e. the number of patents a firm filed for in a particular year in patent classes 
in which it has not issued patents during the past 5 years. A Poisson regression 
approach provides a natural baseline model for such data (Hausman et al., 1984; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Since we use pooled cross-section data with several 
observations on the same firms at different points in time, we modeled the data using 
a random effects Poisson estimation
8
. 













==  (10) 
Where the parameter λit represents the mean and the variance of the event count 
and yit the observed count variable. It is furthermore assumed that: 
 
λit =  β’xit  (11) 
 
with xit being a vector of independent variables. 
                                                 
7
  Those variables were calculated for the year prior to the year of observation. 
8
  Hausman tests indicate that random effects Poisson models are better than fixed effects Poisson 
models. 
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The above specification assumes that the mean and variance of the event count are 
equal. However, for pooled cross-section count data the variance often exceeds the 
mean. This overdispersion is particularly relevant in the case of unobserved 
heterogeneity. The presence of overdispersion does not bias the regression 
coefficients but the computed standard errors in the Poisson regression are understated 
resulting in an overestimation of the statistical significance of the coefficients.  
Therefore, a random effects Poisson estimator used: it does not assume within-firm 
observational independence for the purpose of computing standard errors.  For the 
random effects Poisson estimator equation (2) is changed into: 
 
λit =  β’xit + ui (12) 
 
where ui is a random effect for the i
th
 firm and reflects the firm-specific 
heterogeneity. 
Unobserved heterogeneity may be the result of differences between companies in 
their innovation generating capabilities, and as a consequence, also in their propensity 
or ability to patent. Such unobserved heterogeneity, if present and not controlled for, 
can lead to overdispersion in the data or serial correlation. Differences in patenting 
behavior between companies or between different years are captured by including 
dummy variables in the model. First, the propensity to patent may be partly 
determined by the nationality of the companies or the industry to which they belong. 
Similarly, we introduced annual dummy variables to account for changes over time: 





Table 1 represents the description of the different variables. Table 2 provides the 
descriptive statistics and the correlations between the variables for the 762 
observations in the sample. Although the sample represents the prominent firms in the 
three sectors, there is quite some variance in most of the key variables.      
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Table 3 represents the results of the regression analysis using random-effects 
Poisson estimations explaining the explorative innovation performance of the firms in 
our sample. The estimated alpha coefficient is positive and significant. This indicates 
that important firm-level unobserved effects are present in the data and that a panel 
estimator is preferred above a pooled Poisson estimator. We focus on the full model 
(model 2) but also provide the basic model with only control variables (model 1) to 
show that the coefficients for those variables are robust over the two models. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
Technological distance, network density and betweenness centrality and their 
interaction terms are the independent variables in model 2. The coefficients for the 
linear and quadratic term of the technological distance variable have the expected sign 
and are significant. This result corroborates hypothesis 1. 
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Model 2 also introduces the standardized betweenness centrality of each focal firm 
and the overall network density as independent variables. Hypothesis 2, claiming an 
inverse U-shaped relation between the betweenness centrality and exploration is also 
corroborated. According to hypothesis 3 we expect that exploration is also an inverse-
U shaped function of network density. The positive sign for the linear term and the 
negative sign for the quadratic term indicate that we also find evidence for hypothesis 
3.   
Model 2 also introduces the pairwise interaction terms between the three 
explanatory variables to test hypothesis 4, 5 and 6. We expect a negative interaction 
effect between technological distance and betweenness centrality (hypothesis 4), a 
positive interaction effect between technological distance and density (hypothesis 5), 
and a positive interaction effect between betweenness centrality and density 
(hypothesis 6). As table 3 shows, the signs of these three interaction terms are correct 
but the coefficient for the interaction term between technological distance and 
network density is not significant. As a result, hypothesis 4 and 6 are confirmed but 
there is no confirmation for hypothesis 5.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The joint impact of the three explanatory variables can only be understood if we take 
all variables in model 2 – linear, quadratic and interaction terms – simultaneously into 
consideration. To keep the analysis tractable, we start from the observation that firms 
can only control or influence relations with their direct partners and have virtually no 
possibilities to do so beyond their ego-network (Bae and Garguilo, 2004). Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to consider global density as an exogenous variable for the 
innovating firms. That leaves them with two variables for dealing with their alliance 
network when engaging in exploration endeavours, namely their network position and 
the technological distance with their partners.   
     
 Insert figure 1 here 
 
Consider figure 1 that represents the joint effect of technological distance and 
network centrality, keeping network density constant at the mean level.
9
 The figure 
represents the results for the observed range of observations. As the figure shows, a 
(highly) central position in the network yields ample potential for a high exploration 
performance, if one works with partners at a very limited technological distance, and 
when supported by ‘sufficient’ density (mean level). However, if working from such a 
central position with partners that operate at a large(r) technological distance, 
performance is halved (dropping steeply from 1000% to below 500%). The 
interpretation for this finding may be as follows. Being highly central implies a higher 
chance of being faced with different kinds of knowledge and information (Burt, 
1992). This is beneficial for novelty value but also creates a need to understand and 
integrate potentially unrelated information. Therefore, being highly central requires 
exploration at small technological distances in order to be able to absorb knowledge 
from all parts of the network. The price for not doing so is a sharp decrease in one’s 
                                                 
9
  The boundary values for technological distance and network centrality were calculated as 
the mean plus or minus two times the standard deviation. We further restricted the range 
when these values exceeded the minimum or maximum observed values as indicated in 
Table 2. 
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innovation performance. When centrality lowers, we also notice a decrease in 
innovation performance, from 1000% down to below 600%. In other words, a central 
position is most advantageous, especially at a very small technological distance, and 
remains so for a wide range of technological distances.  
    In contrast, a highly peripheral position (at very low or minimal BC) forms a 
liability as it shows a much lower performance compared to more central positions. 
Although an important difference is that such positions initially show an increase in 
innovation performance when technological distance increases. Moreover, being at 
the periphery can be advantageous at very high levels of technological distance, where 
more central firms perform comparatively lower. This may be interpreted as follows. 
Being at the periphery generally implies that one is outside the immediate sight of 
dominant and more central players. Because of this, selection forces to comply with 
dominant designs and existing systems of production, organization, technical 
standards and so on, may be somewhat less stringent. Hence, deviating from such 
prevailing ‘industry recipes’ (Spender, 1989) becomes easier (Gilsing and 
Nooteboom, 2006). As a consequence, firms at the periphery may enjoy more 
freedom to experiment freely with partners at a high technological distance. It might 
be that this strategy yields more radical innovations with potentially more 
technological and economic value. However, the way we measure our dependent 
variable (based on patents counts) does not take this into account, an issue we come to 
when discussing limitations and possibilities for future research.  
In sum, figure 1 shows that within the range of observations, at mean network 
density we find that if betweenness centrality is high, yielding problems of absorptive 
capacity, one cannot afford to also have large technological distance to direct partners, 
which would compound the problem.  
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
Still, firms need to also consider the degree of overall density and how it 
conditions their choices regarding position and technological distance respectively. 
Consider therefore figure 2 that shows the relation between density and betweenness 
centrality while keeping technological distance at its mean value. Here we see that the 
effect of density on innovation performance has a similar, curvilinear effect for both 
central and peripheral positions. In other words, irrespective of one’s position, high 
density inhibits the existence and utilization of diversity, and hence of novelty value, 
while at low levels it does not support absorption sufficiently. The figure shows that 
even at the mean level of betweenness centrality one needs a certain amount of 
network density to yield requisite absorptive capacity, and an intermediate (not too 
high) level of technological distance is best at all levels of network density. 
 Finally, there are some interesting conclusions to draw from the control variables 
in model 2 of table 3. There are significant differences between the three industries 
(chemical industry, car manufacturing and pharmaceutical industry) in their 
propensity to get involved into explorative innovation. The country of origin of the 
different companies plays no role in explaining both types of innovation.  
Size has a positive and significant effect on the rate of innovation when firms are 
exploring new technological areas. Since this explanatory variable is in the log form, 
its coefficient in the Poisson specification can be interpreted as elasticity between firm 
size and the dependent variable. The coefficient is substantially smaller than one 
suggesting – ceteris paribus - that the frequency of patenting increases with firm size 
but less than proportionately. As a result, small firms are more innovative than larger 
firms when they explore new technologies. This is in line with the results of previous 
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research on the relation between firm size and R&D (Nooteboom and Vossen, 1995), 
and with research showing that new and more radical inventions are likely to originate 
with entrants rather than incumbents (Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986). This 
finding is also in line with the organizational learning literature: large established 
organizations have difficulties in diversifying into new technological areas, inhibiting 
experimentation and favoring specialization along existing technological trajectories 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). 
As expected, R&D-intensity has a positive and significant effect on the innovation 
rate of the companies in the sample. The age of the firm has a negative but non-
significant effect on exploratory patents. This result suggests that established 
companies that had time to develop capabilities in particular technological fields do 
not necessarily have a competitive advantage over new entrants in the exploration of 
new technological fields. By contrast, the negative coefficient for age indicates that 
newly established firms might have a slight advantage in exploring new technological 
fields and (although we have no conclusive evidence). This is in line with previous 
research that focused on the role of new firms in the creation of new technologies 
(Methe et al., 1997). 
Following our findings, we can conclude that our key argument is confirmed, 
claiming that successful exploration requires a delicate balance between the ‘twin 
tasks’ of novelty creation on the one hand and its efficient absorption on the other 
hand. We found that highly central firms enjoy the strongest improvements of their 
explorative innovation performance and this effect declines steadily when centrality 
decreases, or alternatively, when technological distances increases. Peripheral 
positions show the least performance, although such positions can be attractive when 
cooperating with partners at a very large technological distance. In other words, 
success rates for exploration are not spread equally across network positions.  
    However, position alone does not tell the full story. Our empirical findings clearly 
indicate that exploration success also depends on the two other dimensions of 
embeddedness, namely technological distance and network density. Therefore, an 
important conclusion is also that the three elements of network embeddedness need to 
be considered jointly in order to understand their complementary effects on both 
novelty creation and absorptive capacity. This is an important finding and contributes 
to the literature in several ways.  
One is that it contrasts with the tradition in the literature on alliances and interfirm 
networks with its bias towards to the role of position (Powell et al., 2005). The 
message as conveyed from this study is that for exploration the value of a position 
depends on the technological distance with others and on the degree of network 
density.  
A second contribution is that the social network literature specifically considers 
´social distance´ between any two nodes (here firms) in the network, in terms of the 
number of links on the shortest path between them. Here we have added technological 
distance between any two firms. This has enabled us to go beyond the dominant focus 
on partners’ similarity and to understand the positive role of technological distance in 
view of exploration. Such a cognition-based view has been largely ignored by the 
literature with its main focus on the role of economic and social factors regarding 
alliance formation and the role of network embeddedness (Gulati, 1998; Phelps, 
2005).  
It also contributes to the literature on learning and innovation that stresses the 
recombination potential arising from distances in cognition (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Nooteboom 2000; Malerba, 2004), but leaves unexplained what are the associated 
social structural implications. Moreover, considering the role of global density 
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enables one to go beyond the dyadic level, which has been mostly studied in the 
literature (Salancik, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Powell et al., 2005). The focus on dyads 
reflects an undersocialized view of alliances and ignores in how far positive effects of 
a central or peripheral position can be mitigated or amplified by the entire structure. 
We found that this structure, in terms of its density, plays an important role indeed 
and conditions the potential benefits of different degrees of centrality for exploration. 
[Beetje herhaling hier volgens mij:] Both for central and peripheral position an 
intermediate degree of density seems to be most effective. In contrast, high levels of 
density may inhibit the existence and utilization of diversity, and hence of novelty 
value, while at low levels it does not support absorption in a sufficient way. 
This points to an interesting new insight that sheds a different light on the validity 
of the arguments of Burt versus Coleman. Success in exploration requires a dual 
emphasis on the benefits of non-redundant contacts for potential novel combinations 
as well as on network density in view of integrating the diverse inputs obtained from 
such contacts. In other words, it seems that both views convey some truth and may be 
seen as complements instead of opposites as stressed in the literature (Hansen et al., 
1999; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rowley et al, 2000; Ahuja, 2000).  
    Limitations of this study, which may provide directions for future research, are as 
follows. One is that we have studied exploration that is new to the firm. In other 
words, we cannot substantiate our claims and findings beyond this relatively moderate 
degree of exploration. It therefore seems useful in future studies to also consider more 
radical degrees of exploration such as the discovery of ‘newly emerging’ technologies 
(new to the industry) or ‘pioneering’ technologies (new to the world) respectively 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). For these kinds of exploration one needs partners at 
presumably (much) larger technological distances than considered here and we 
anticipate that this will have major implications for the role of both betweenness 
centrality and density.  
    A second limitation relates to our dependent variable. We have counted the number 
of explorative patents for each firm and in this way have treated all patents equally. 
Of course, patents differ in technological and economic value and taking this into 
account would definitely enrich future work in this field. Weighing patents based on 
the number of citations that they receive seems a straightforward way to do this 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Such an approach would also enable to study the validity 
of our conjecture that peripheral firms have better possibilities for more radical 
exploration when compared with central firms. A final limitation is that we did not 
consider the effect of 'tie strength' on exploration. Different types of alliances can be 
weighted according to the ‘strength’ of the relationship as some authors did (see 
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gulati 1995b; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). This was 
beyond the scope of the current paper and would require additional research and 
hypothesis building regarding which alliance type is more instrumental for the 
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Table 1: Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
Variable name Variable description  
 
Dependent variable  
Explorative patents Number of patents a firm successfully filed for in year t within patent classes in which it has not been 
active in the five years prior to the given year. The status of ‘explorative patent’ is kept for three years. 
Independent variables 
Cognitive distance  The average of the correlations between the focal firm’s technology profile and that of each of its alliance 
partners. The variable is transformed; the values range from 0 top 100, where increasing values stand for 
increasing distances between the technology portfolio of the focal firm and that of its alliance partners. 
Technology profiles are calculated based on the revealed technology advantage or specialization of each 
firm in each of the patent classes.  
Network density Overall network density is calculated as the number of  technological alliances in the network divided by 
all possible alliances between the networking firms 
Betweenness centrality Betweenness centrality is calculated as the fraction of shortest paths of alliances between other companies 
that pass through the focal firm. In this way, its is measuring the control of  a firm over the information in 
the alliance network. We standardized this measure to compare the values across different alliance 




Age The number of years since a company is founded   
Firm size (ln revenues) Natural logarithm of the total sales of the firm in t-1 (x  1000 Euro)  
R&D intensity  R&D expenditures in t-1 divided by total sales in t-1  
Year Dummy variables indicating a particular year in the observed period 1986-1997  
Chemical company Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a chemical company (default = pharmaceutical company) 
Car manufacturer Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a car manufacturer (default = pharmaceutical company) 
Europe Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Europe (default = Asian company) 
US Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in the U.S. default = Asian company) 
 
 
Note: All network variables are based on alliance network representing all the technology-based alliances that were established in an industry during the five 
years prior to year t 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
 
1 # of explorative patents  9.77 14.44 0 132   
2 Technol.distance (TD) 42.42 7.07 0 52.4 -0.00   
3 TD
2
 1849 533.9 22.66 2754 0.02 0.98  
4 Network density (D) 1.32 0.58 0.47 2.94 -0.02 0.16 0.17 
5 D
2 
2.07 1.80 0.226 8.62 -0.01 0.15 0.17 0.97 
6 Betweenness centr. (BC) 4.45 5.79 0 37.88 0.24 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.11 
7 BC
2 
53.34 138.8 0 1434 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.16 0.91 
8 TD*D 56.52 28.27 6.80 148.6 -0.02 0.46 0.47 0.93 0.91 0.11 0.15 
9 TD*BC 190.04 252.6 0 1655 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.99 0.91 015 
10 BC*D 6.218 10.62 0 100.2 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.36 0.37 0.89 0.90 0.34 0.90 
11 Firm size (ln sales) 8.590 1.79 1.01 11.91 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.25 
12 R&D intensity 0.102 0.22 0 2.40 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.04 -0.59 
13 Age 81.04 46.02 0 236 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.27 -0.28 
14 Car manufacturer 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.01 0.24 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.11 0.14 0.68 0.14 0.28 0.37 -0.17 002 
15 Chemical company 0.36 0.48 0 1 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.29 -0.30 -0.14 -0.12 -0.28 -0.15 -0.17 0.09 -0.21 0.05 -0.45 
16 Firm is European 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.02 -002 0.12 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.11 
17 Firm is US-based 0.43 0.49 0 1 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.16 0.22 -0.11 -0.09 -0.20 
18 Year 1986 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.33 0.30 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.02 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 
19 Year 1987 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.28 -0.02 -0.00 0.26 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -001 
20 Year 1988 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02  
21 Year 1989 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
22 Year 1990 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.01 
23 Year 1991  0.08 0.28 0 1 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01 
24 Year 1992 0.08 0.28 0 1 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01 
25 Year 1993 0.09 0.29 0 1 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
26 Year 1994 0.08 0.28 0 1 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.00 -0.02 
27 Year 1995 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
28 Year 1996 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.22 -0.15 -0.02 0.01 -0.21 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
  
 
Note: Based on 762 observations
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Table 2  (continued): Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (continued) 
 
Variable 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27  
 
17 Firm is US-based -0.50  
18 Year 1986 0.04 -0.03   
19 Year 1987 0.00 -0.01 -0.09   
20 Year 1988 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.09   
21 Year 1989  0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 
22 Year 1990  0.00  0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
23 Year 1991 -0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09   
24 Year 1992 -0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
25 Year 1993 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
26 Year 1994 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
27 Year 1995 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 











Variable Model 1  Model 2   
 
Explanatory variables 
(Cognitive distance)/1000  52.0753**  
   (21.6850) 
((Cognitive distance)
2
)/1000  -0.7273***  
   (0.2737) 
Network density /1000  920.5564*** 
   (213.1218) 
((Network density)
2
)/1000  -354.5148*** 
   (41.5999) 
Betweeness centrality / 1000  98.8357** 
   (29.0359)   
(Betweenness centrallity)
2
)/1000  -0.6982** 
   (0.2796) 
((Cognitive distance)  6.6694 
 * (density))/1000  (4.3378) 
((Cognitive distance)    -1.9888*** 
 * (betweeness centrality))/1000  (0.6783) 
((Betweeness centrality)    9.2656** 
 * (density))/1000  (3.9564) 
 
Control variables A 
Firm size (ln sales) 0.4351***  0.3676***  
  (0.0459)  (0.0465)  
R&D-intensity 1.1634***  0.9429***  
  (0.2452)  (0.2486)   
Age  -0.0014   -0.0027  
  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  
Car manufacturer -0.8821***  -0.9208***  
  (0.3001)  (0.2972)  
Chemical industry -0.5303**  -0.5205*  
  (0.2705)  (0.2680)  
Europe 0.3664  0.2155  
  (0.3010)  (0.2946)  
US  -0.0698  -0.0711   
  (0.2658)  (0.2651)  
Constant -1.4094***  -2.2331***  
  (0.5272)  (0.7217)  
alpha 0.9890***
B
  0.9773***  
  (0.1457)  (0.1431) 
   
Number of firms 85 85 
Number of firms-years 762 762   
Log-Likelihood -3009.4 -2951.5  
Notes:  Standard error between brackets 
 
 
 ***   p  < 0.01;  **   p  < 0.05;  *   p  < 0.10  
A:  Year dummy variables are included in the regressions but the coefficients and standard errors 
are not reported in the table. 
B: Likelihood-ratio test of alpha = 0 
 
 















































At mean network density 
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